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The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997
required HCFA to implement health-status-
based risk adjustment for Medicare capita-
tion payments for managed care plans by
January 1, 2000.  In support of this man-
date, HCFA has been collecting inpatient
encounter data from health plans since 1997.
These data include diagnoses and other infor-
mation that can be used to identify chronic
medical problems that contribute to higher
costs, so that health plans can be paid more
when they care for sicker patients.  In this
article, the authors describe the risk-adjust-
ment model HCFA is implementing in the
year 2000, known as the Principal Inpatient
Diagnostic Cost Group (PIPDCG) model.
INTRODUCTION
The goal of implementing health-status-
based risk adjustment for Medicare capita-
tion payments is to fairly compensate
health plans for the expected costs associ-
ated with the disease burden of their
enrollees.  In support of this BBA mandate,
HCFA has been collecting inpatient
encounter data from health plans with dis-
charges occurring since July 1997.  These
data include diagnoses and other informa-
tion that can be used for risk adjustment.
Risk adjustment will initially be based only
on inpatient diagnoses.
The current PIPDCG model is the cul-
mination of more than a decade of research
supported by HCFA (Ash et al., 1989; Ellis
and Ash, 1995; Ellis et al., 1996).  Previous
publications describe analyses of many
methodological issues and alternative
models.  Here, we describe the specific
model developed for year 2000 implemen-
tation and assess its performance.  More
details on development of the PIPDCG pay-
ment model are available in Pope et al.
(1999).  The physician co-authors have dis-
cussed clinical classification and other
issues elsewhere (Iezzoni et al., 1998).
In this article, we first describe and
briefly review the role of risk adjustment in
Medicare payments to managed care plans
and how the PIPDCG model determines a
beneficiary’s relative risk factor.  Second,
we comment on the strengths and limita-
tions of using inpatient encounter data to
adjust capitation payments for health sta-
tus.  This section puts the PIPDCG model
in broader context and presents some con-
cerns that helped shape model develop-
ment.  Third, we describe model develop-
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ment: our data, sample, and variable defin-
itions, the PIPDCG diagnostic classifica-
tion system, and how diagnoses are sorted
into Diagnostic Cost Groups (DCGs).  The
analysis and calibration of demographic
factors for the PIPDCG model is reported
next.  Excluding diagnoses from short hos-
pital stays is then considered.  Finally, we
examine the predictive accuracy and stabil-
ity of the model and draw some conclu-
sions.
MEDICARE RISK ADJUSTMENT
Medicare pays health maintenance orga-
nizations (HMOs) a monthly capitated
amount for the medical care of each
enrolled Medicare beneficiary.  In the year
2000, 10 percent of payment for most bene-
ficiaries is based on the PIPDCG risk-
adjustment model, with the percentage
scheduled to rise in following years.  (The
other 90 percent of payment is based on
Medicare’s historical adjusted average per
capita cost [AAPCC] payment methodolo-
gy as modified by the BBA.  Enrollees who
have been entitled to Medicare for less
than 18 months will be paid for using a
demographic model for new entitlees.)
This capitated payment is the product of a
county rate, determined by the beneficia-
ry’s residence, and a PIPDCG risk factor
for that beneficiary.  That is:
Payment = (Beneficiary relative risk
factor) * (county rate)
For example, if a beneficiary living in a
county with a monthly rate of $500 has a
relative risk factor of 1.10, Medicare will
pay a managed care plan 1.10*$500 = $550
per month for that beneficiary’s medical
care.  The relative risk factor reflects the
expected relative costliness of providing
medical services to beneficiaries in differ-
ent health states.  By paying more for sick-
er beneficiaries, managed care plans are
encouraged to enroll and work to satisfy
the needs of such people.   In this article,
we explain how the PIPDCG model calcu-
lates an individual’s risk factor.  The risk-
adjustment model is also used in calculat-
ing the county rate, as explained by Ingber
(2000). 
PIPDCG RELATIVE RISK FACTORS
The central feature of the PIPDCG
model is calculating each beneficiary’s rel-
ative risk factor.  A beneficiary whose
Medicare expenditures are predicted to
equal the national average has a relative
risk factor of 1.00.   Risk factors greater
than 1.00 indicate above average expected
costliness; factors below 1.00 indicate
lower-than-average expected costs.  Tables
1 and 2 can be used to construct an indi-
vidual’s relative risk factor, starting with a
base year (year 1) of demographic and
medical information:
• Step 1. Compute a demographic factor
(Table 1) by adding up to three individ-
ual factors: (1) age and sex; (2) original-
ly disabled status (for a person who is
now over age 65 but was previously enti-
tled to Medicare because of disability);
(3) Medicaid status (for a person who
was entitled to Medicaid at any time dur-
ing the base year).
• Step 2.  Select the PIPDCG factor (Table
2) by: (1) assigning each hospital stay of at
least 2 days to a PIPDCG category based
on the principal medical problem that led
to the admission; then (2) identifying the
relative risk factor associated with the
highest numbered of these PIPDCG cate-
gories.  Note that beneficiaries with no
hospital stays of at least 2 days are
assigned to PIPDCG 4, along with those
whose only hospitalizations fall into the
lowest numbered PIPDCG, that is, 4; both
groups receive PIPDCG 4’s factor of zero.
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• Step 3: Add the demographic and PIPD-
CG factors to achieve a relative risk
score. If Medicare is not this person’s
primary payer, multiply this score by
0.21 to represent the expected part of
total health care costs for which HCFA is
responsible.
As an example, a male 69 years of age,
not enrolled in Medicaid, never eligible for
Medicare by disability, and not covered by
another insurer, receives a demographic
factor of 0.541.  If he was not hospitalized
(in year 1), nothing (the factor associated
with PIPDCG 4) is added to this, and his
Medicare expenditures this year are
expected to be 54.1 percent of average.
However, beneficiaries hospitalized for
serious illnesses are assigned to higher
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Table 1
Demographic Factors Used by HCFA1, by Sex and Age Group
Additive Factors
Age/Sex Originally
Sex and Age Group Factor Disabled Medicaid
Male
0-34 Years 0.367 — 0.125 
35-44 Years 0.380 — 0.283 
45-54 Years 0.487 — 0.370 
55-59 Years 0.615 — 0.397 
60-64 Years 0.760 — 0.418 
65-69 Years 0.541 0.415 0.440 
70-74 Years 0.705 0.398 0.457 
75-79 Years 0.907 0.334 0.461 
80-84 Years 1.077 0.287 0.445 
85-89 Years 1.258 0.237 0.404 
90-94 Years 1.376 0.189 0.331 
95 or Over 1.357 0.141 0.242 
Female
0-34 Years 0.362 — 0.192 
35-44 Years 0.403 — 0.312 
45-54 Years 0.526 — 0.367 
55-59 Years 0.643 — 0.397 
60-64 Years 0.891 — 0.412 
65-69 Years 0.453 0.605 0.433 
70-74 Years 0.588 0.576 0.440 
75-79 Years 0.747 0.519 0.454 
80-84 Years 0.918 0.415 0.423 
85-89 Years 1.096 0.313 0.327 
90-94 Years 1.162 0.232 0.231 
95 or Over 1.128 0.152 0.168 
1 Refer to Table 2 for PIPDCG add-on factors. Working-aged multiplicative factor = 0.21.
NOTES: HCFA is Health Care Financing Administration. PIPDCG is Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group. Factors shown are for people with at
least 1 year of eligibility. HCFA  requires 12 months of data. Medicare beneficiaries under age 65 are eligible because of disability. The Medicare 
population mean = 1.
SOURCE: Health Care Financing Administration: Proposed Method of Incorporating Health Status Risk Adjusters into Medicare+Choice Payments.
Report to Congress. Baltimore, MD. March 1, 1999.
Table 2
Add-On Factors for PIPDCGs
PIPDCG Factor
4 0.000
5 0.375 
6 0.458 
7 0.697 
8 0.822 
9 0.915 
10 1.170 
11 1.271 
12 1.662 
14 2.000 
16 2.438 
18 2.656 
20 3.392 
23 3.823 
26 4.375 
29 5.189 
NOTE: PIPDCG is Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group.
SOURCE: Health Care Financing Administration: Proposed Method
of Incorporating Health Status Risk Adjusters into Medicare+Choice
Payments. Report to Congress. Baltimore, MD. March 1, 1999.
numbered PIPDCGs.  The PIPDCG num-
bers (4 through 29) reflect approximate
mean Medicare expenditures in the year
following hospitalization, in thousands of
1996 dollars.  For example, if our sample
beneficiary were hospitalized for leukemia,
he would be assigned to PIPDCG 29,
because people with leukemia in 1995 had
average 1996 costs of $30,456.
Classification in this PIPDCG increases his
expected costs for year 2 by adding 5.189
to the demographic factor, for a total of
5.730.  That is, such a person is expected to
incur costs in year 2 that are nearly 6 times
average.  
Tables 1 and 2 show that being older,
male, enrolled in Medicaid, originally enti-
tled to Medicare by disability, and hospital-
ized last year for more serious illnesses (i.e.,
assigned to a higher numbered PIPDCG)
all increase a beneficiary’s relative risk fac-
tor. “Working-aged” status, however,
reduces the risk factor by almost four-
fifths, because then Medicare is only
responsible for paying for part of the bene-
ficiary’s health care.
Next, we examine the advantages and
limitations of using principal hospital diag-
noses to measure beneficiaries’ health sta-
tus. Then, we describe how we develop the
PIPDCG model.
RISK-ADJUSTING USING 
INPATIENT ENCOUNTER DATA
The BBA mandated improved risk-
adjustment formulas within 3 years.
HCFA’s year 2000 health-based risk-adjust-
ment model uses inpatient hospital admis-
sions records because only hospital data
were feasible to collect, calibrate, and
process within this time frame.  Collecting
inpatient records is seen as an interim step
to collecting  full encounter data from all
(or most) care settings.  Virtually all policy
analysts support HCFA’s intention to
implement full-encounter risk adjustment
as soon as feasible, and several all-
encounter models have been developed
and calibrated for Medicare (e.g., Ellis et
al., 1996; Weiner et al., 1996).  Yet, because
risk adjustment in Medicare is beginning
with inpatient data, it is useful to reflect on
the strengths and weaknesses of an inpa-
tient-only method.
The primary advantages of inpatient-
based risk adjustment over all-encounter
risk adjustment are practical.  Inpatient
diagnoses are obtained more easily and
cheaply, and the data-collection burden on
health plans and providers is substantially
lower than with ambulatory encounter
data.  Inpatient diagnoses—especially prin-
cipal diagnoses—are likely to be more
accurate and are easier to audit and verify,
and their quality is more nearly uniform
across different systems.  Because inpa-
tient admission is also a proxy for severity
of illness, it seems reasonable to begin the
transition to risk-adjusted payments by
focusing on the most severely ill and
expensive enrollees, who are most likely 
to be hospitalized. 
An inpatient admission—especially one
of at least 2 days’ duration—represents a
significant expenditure by a health plan.
Hospitalizing a patient who does not really
need it, for the purpose of recording a diag-
nosis that would increase payments next
year, is less likely because hospitalization is
so disruptive and expensive.  With an all-
encounter model, a patient could easily be
scheduled for extra ambulatory visits, dur-
ing which additional, payment-increasing
diagnoses could be recorded.  Another ben-
efit of inpatient-based risk adjustment is
that capitated health plans, which receive
no marginal payment for providing health
care, may have an incentive to underpro-
vide medical care, especially expensive ser-
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vices such as hospitalizations (Newhouse,
1996).  An inpatient-based risk-adjustment
system partly mitigates this disincentive of
capitation.
The primary disadvantage of inpatient-
based risk adjustment is the distorted incen-
tive for health plans to choose among sites
of care.  Plans obtain higher risk-adjusted
payments only by admitting their enrollees
to the hospital.  Thus, plans can be penal-
ized when they successfully avoid an unnec-
essary admission by providing appropriate
ambulatory care.  The incentive to admit is
contrary to the usual tenets of managed
health care, because managed care plans
have achieved most of their cost savings by
reducing inpatient hospital use (Miller and
Luft, 1997).  Mitigating inappropriate incen-
tives for hospital admission is the motive for
some aspects of the PIPDCG model devel-
opment, as we discuss later.
Using only the principal diagnosis from
inpatient stays to infer health status, as the
PIPDCG model does, has related advan-
tages and disadvantages.  The principal
diagnosis is likely to be of good quality
because hospitals and attending physicians
are accustomed to audits of this diagnosis
in the diagnosis-related groups (DRGs)
Medicare payment system, and it may be
the only diagnosis available from some
plans and hospitals.  It is also a proxy for
severity, because it is the problem that was
the reason for the admission.  A risk-adjust-
ment model based only on the principal
diagnosis is not sensitive to the complete-
ness of coding of secondary diagnoses.  On
the other hand, using only the principal
diagnosis makes the model particularly
sensitive to resequencing of diagnoses.  It
is sometimes unclear which diagnosis
should be principal, and plans have an
incentive to reorder the diagnoses to max-
imize reimbursement.  (Medicare DRG
payments already create incentives for hos-
pitals to consider the order of principal
inpatient diagnoses for their payment
incentives.  The PIPDCG system may mod-
ify those incentives in some circum-
stances.)  Also, because hospital admis-
sions are often precipitated by acute health
crises, the principal diagnosis may be more
likely to represent an acute diagnosis than
the underlying chronic illness. This con-
sideration is somewhat at odds with the
rationale for prospective risk adjustment,
which seeks to predict year 2 costs from
chronic illness.  Finally, modeling choices
(such as restricting attention to the single
most costly principal diagnosis) made that
were to mitigate the perverse incentives
associated with hospital-based illness
detection reduce predictive accuracy.
Even so, the PIPDCG model is far more
powerful than the demographic factors in
the AAPCC system used previously by
HCFA to pay Medicare health plans. By
providing greater fairness and accuracy in
capitated payments, the current change in
payment formulas is “a step in the right
direction, albeit a modest step” (Iezzoni et
al., 1998). 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PIPDCG
MODEL
Data, Sample, Expenditures
The PIPDCG model has been developed
and calibrated with data from the tradition-
al Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program,
reflecting the legislative mandate that
Medicare capitation be based on 95 per-
cent of what a beneficiary is expected to
cost in the FFS program, as it was under
the previous AAPCC methodology.  Risk-
adjustment factors developed from FFS
data are in this sense consistent with the
historical basis of Medicare’s capitation
payment methodology.  Yet even without
such a mandate, FFS data represent the
only comprehensive and representative
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source of information on costs for treat-
ment of Medicare beneficiaries.  The
implicit assumption is that relative costs of
patients with specified levels of disease
burden are similar in the FFS and man-
aged care sectors.
The PIPDCG model was developed on a
5-percent sample of Medicare’s FFS
enrollees in 1995 and 1996.  Diagnoses
from hospitalizations in the base year of
1995 were used to predict 1996 Medicare
expenditures.  Beneficiaries who died in
1995 were excluded from the sample, but
1996 decedents were included.  To ensure
a complete base-year diagnostic profile and
complete 1996 expenditures, beneficiaries
in the sample had to be enrolled in
Medicare FFS throughout 1995 and 1996.
Beneficiaries eligible at any time during
the sample period for the end stage renal
disease program and beneficiaries for
whom Medicare was not the primary payer
were excluded.
Expenditures were aggregated from
hospital inpatient, hospital outpatient, pro-
fessional (physician/supplier), home
health, and durable medical equipment
claims.  Hospice expenditures were
excluded because managed care plans are
not responsible for hospice care.  (All
months of hospice eligibility and expendi-
tures during those months were excluded
from the analysis.)  Deductibles and copay-
ments for Medicare-covered services that
are the responsibility of beneficiaries were
excluded from expenditures.  Thus, expen-
ditures are Medicare payments to
providers.  Indirect medical education
expenditures were also excluded, because
the BBA specifies that medical education
payments are to be phased out of capitation
payments to managed care plans and paid
directly to teaching hospitals.1
To correctly estimate monthly payments
for all beneficiaries, including those who
died, we weighted observations by
Medicare-eligible months in the prediction
year (1996).  First, we annualized 1996 pay-
ments, dividing actual total 1996 payments
by the fraction of the year (rounded up to
the nearest whole month) that each benefi-
ciary was alive and eligible for Part A and
Part B.  Each observation was then weight-
ed by the same fraction in all analyses.
Annualizing and weighting observations
results in unbiased estimates of the aver-
age and total payments for a group in
which individuals are eligible for different
fractions of the year.
Base-year diagnoses were obtained from
1995 hospitalizations in facilities eligible
for Medicare’s prospective payment sys-
tem (PPS) and non-PPS facilities and units
including psychiatric, rehabilitation, long-
term, children’s and other specialty hospi-
tals.  Diagnoses from skilled nursing facili-
ties (SNFs) and skilled nursing units were
not used.  Demographic information,
described in more detail later, was
obtained from Medicare enrollment files.
Table 3 describes our 1995-1996 model
development sample, which contains
1,387,105 beneficiaries.  In 1996, no pay-
ment was made for 9.9 percent of our sam-
ple, and 4.8 percent died in that year.
Diagnostic Classification
The goal of our classification of diag-
noses was to differentiate beneficiaries
expected to have different levels of
Medicare expenditures in year 2.
Beneficiaries who are hospitalized for
treatment of serious illnesses—for exam-
ple, lung cancer—in  year 1 are expected to
have higher expenditures in year 2 than
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1 Medical education payments are comprised of indirect and
direct payments.  It was not feasible to exclude direct payments.
Indirect payments, which we excluded, represent about two-
thirds of total medical education payments.
beneficiaries who are not hospitalized or
who are hospitalized for less serious ill-
nesses.  To begin, we classified all of the
more than 15,000 International
Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision,
Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) (Public
Health Service and Health Care Financing
Administration, 1980) diagnostic codes
into 172 Principal Inpatient Diagnostic
Groups (PIPDxGs).  The primary criteria
used in forming PIPDxGs were clinical
coherence and adequate sample size (so
that future mean expenditures could be
estimated reliably, refer to Ash et al., 1989;
Ellis and Ash, 1995; and Ellis et al., 1996,
for further discussion).  For example,
PIPDxG 1 is central nervous system infec-
tions.  In 1995, 222 Medicare beneficiaries
in our sample were hospitalized with a prin-
cipal diagnosis falling into this category,
and they had mean 1996 Medicare expen-
ditures of $11,291, more than double the
sample average of $5,186.
The next step was to select diagnoses for
inclusion in the payment model.  Including
all diagnoses in the risk-adjustment model
creates incentives for even relatively
healthy people to be admitted for minor
diagnoses to obtain higher payment.  We
excluded diagnoses that may be minor,
transitory, or non-specific.  Examples of
excluded diagnoses are sprains (minor),
appendicitis (transitory, i.e., having defini-
tive treatment), and fever (non-specific).
By excluding such diagnoses, risk adjust-
ment focuses on the burden of high-cost,
chronic illness.  Altogether, 75 of the 172
PIPDxGs were excluded from the payment
model.  (Note that the costs associated
with these excluded diagnoses are not
dropped.  The model captures these costs
in other factors, such as age and sex.)
Special attention was paid to two diag-
noses, chemotherapy and human immun-
odeficiency virus/acquired immunodefi-
ciency syndrome (HIV/AIDS).  The PIPDCG
model is diagnosis-based and generally
excludes treatments or procedures such as
chemotherapy.  However, we were reluc-
tant to exclude chemotherapy because it
identifies a group of very ill beneficiaries
with high expected future costs, and in the
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Table 3
Statistics for the 1995-1996 Medicare 5-Percent Sample1, by Beneficiary Characteristic
Number of Percent of Mean 1996 Ratio to
Characteristic Beneficiaries Total Sample Payments the Mean
Overall Sample 1,387,105   100.0    $5,186     1.00     
Disabled (Age < 64) 154,784   11.2        4,636     0.89     
Younger Disabled (Age < 44) 55,579   4.0        3,846     0.74     
Older Disabled (Age 45 - 64) 99,205   7.2        5,082     0.98     
Aged (Age > 65) 1,232,321   88.8        5,256     1.01     
Originally Disabled 87,154   6.3        7,966     1.54     
Younger Elderly (Age 65 - 84) 1,073,853   77.4        4,917     0.95     
Older Elderly (Age 85 or Over) 158,468   11.4        7,685     1.48     
Medicaid 204,267   14.7        7,290     1.41     
Disabled (Age < 64) 66,370   4.8        5,556     1.07     
Elderly (Age > 65) 137,897   9.9        8,161     1.57     
Non-Medicaid 1,182,838   85.3        4,828     0.93     
Disabled (Age < 64) 88,414   6.4        3,944     0.76     
Elderly (Age > 65) 1,094,424   78.9        4,901     0.95     
Female 812,354   58.6        5,098     0.98     
Male 574,760   41.4        5,310     1.02     
1 Excludes working aged in 1995 and 1996.
SOURCE: Health Economics Research, Inc., analysis of 1995 and 1996 Medicare claims data, Waltham, MA, 1999.
DRG-based payment system, hospitals are
required by HCFA to code chemotherapy
as the principal diagnosis when it is pro-
vided for hospitalized cancer patients.  Our
solution was to recognize chemotherapy
admissions when coded with a “V-code” for
chemotherapy as the principal diagnosis
and then to classify such admissions by the
most serious type of cancer present among
the secondary inpatient diagnoses.
HIV/AIDS is another special case, associ-
ated with very high future expenditures.  If
admission is for an HIV-related condition,
HIV/AIDS may not be the principal diag-
nosis.  We chose to allow classification into
the HIV/AIDS PIPDxG based on either a
principal or secondary diagnosis of
HIV/AIDS.  These are the only two situa-
tions in which secondary diagnoses are
used in the Medicare PIPDCG model.
The result of our preliminary decisions
was a list of diagnoses that were eligible to
trigger increased payments. The next
problem was how to differentiate benefi-
ciaries by their expected future costliness
based on this list of diagnoses.  If each hos-
pitalized beneficiary were hospitalized only
once, ranking diagnoses by future costli-
ness would be straightforward.  However,
approximately one-half of beneficiaries
who are hospitalized during a year are hos-
pitalized more than once. The PIPDCG
model addresses the problem of multiple
diagnoses per beneficiary by introducing a
hierarchy; it identifies only the single diag-
nosis most predictive of higher future
expenditures and ignores other diagnoses
(admissions).  To rank and group diag-
noses by their expected future costliness,
we used the DCG sorting algorithm (Ash
et al., 1989; Ellis and Ash, 1995).  
The DCG sorting algorithm starts by
computing the mean 1996 expenditures of
beneficiaries with each 1995 diagnosis.
Note that the costs for a female hospital-
ized for two distinct medical problems will
contribute to two PIPDxG means. All diag-
noses are then ranked in descending order
of their 1996 expenditures.  The highest
ranked diagnoses (PIPDxGs) are grouped
into the highest ranked aggregated cost-
based grouping or PIPDCG.  The highest
ranked PIPDCG is PIPDCG 29, which
includes the PIPDxGs of HIV/AIDS and
blood, lymphatic cancers/neoplasms.  The
PIPDCG number, 29, refers to the approxi-
mate mean 1996 Medicare expenditures in
thousands of dollars for beneficiaries
assigned to the PIPDCG.  Each beneficiary
admitted to the hospital in 1995 with a
principal or secondary diagnosis of
HIV/AIDS or a principal diagnosis of
blood, lymphatic cancers, or neoplasms, is
uniquely assigned to PIPDCG 29.
After the highest ranked PIPDCG is
formed, beneficiaries assigned to it are
removed from the sample, mean expendi-
tures by diagnosis are recomputed, and the
diagnoses are re-ranked. The next-
highest-cost PIPDxGs are included in the
second-ranked PIPDCG, number 26.  This
PIPDCG  includes the diagnoses metastatic
cancer and brain/nervous system cancers,
with mean 1996 expenditures of approxi-
mately $26,000 each. Beneficiaries
assigned to PIPDCG 26 are then removed
from the sample, mean expenditures by
diagnosis are recalculated, and the process
is repeated.  In this way, all diagnoses
(PIPDxGs) are assigned to PIPDCGs.
The result of the DCG sorting algorithm
is the 16 PIPDCGs (with number labels
ranging from 29 on down to 4) presented in
Table 4, which shows the diagnoses
assigned to each of the cost-based group-
ings.  (The physician co-authors reviewed
the results of the sorting algorithm for clin-
ical plausibility and incentives, and reas-
signed a small number of PIPDxGs.  Refer
to Pope et al., 1999 for details.)  The rela-
tive risk factor of beneficiaries assigned to
the base PIPDCG 4—which includes bene-
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Table 4
Diagnoses Included in Each Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group (PIPDCG)
Group Diagnosis
PIPDCG 29 HIV/AIDS1
Blood, Lymphatic Cancers/Neoplasms2
PIPDCG 26 Metastatic Cancer2
Brain/Nervous System Cancer2
PIPDCG 23 Liver/Pancreas/Esophagus Cancer2
End Stage Liver Disorders
Cardio-Respiratory Failure and Shock
Decubitus and Chronic Skin Ulcers
PIPDCG 20 Diabetes with Chronic Complications
Coma and Encephalopathy
Aspiration Pneumonia
Renal Failure/Nephritis
PIPDCG 18 Cancer of Placenta/Ovary/Uterine Adnexa2
Blood/Immune Disorders
Paralytic and Other Neurologic Disorders
Polyneuropathy
Gram-Negative/Staphylococcus Pneumonia
PIPDCG 16 Mouth/Pharynx/Larynx/Other Respiratory Cancer2
Lung Cancer2
Cirrhosis, Other Liver Disorders
Congestive Heart Failure
Atherosclerosis of Major Vessel
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
PIPDCG 14 Septicemia (Blood Poisoning)/Shock
Adrenal Gland, Metabolic Disorders
Delirium/Hallucinations
Paranoia and Other Psychoses
Anxiety Disorders
Personality Disorders
Degenerative Neurologic Disorders
Spinal Cord Injury
PIPDCG 12 Tuberculosis
Stomach, Small Bowel, Other Digestive Cancer2
Rectal Cancer2
Cancer of Bladder, Kidney, Urinary Organs
Benign Brain/Nervous System Neoplasm
Diabetes with Acute Complications/Hypoglycemic Coma
Inflammatory Bowel Disease
Rheumatoid Arthritis and Connective Tissue Disease
Bone/Joint Infections/Necrosis
Dementia
Drug/Alcohol Psychoses
Major Depression/Manic and Depressive Disorders
Epilepsy and Other Seizure Disorders
Cerebral Hemorrhage
Stroke
Peripheral Vascular Disease
Pulmonary Fibrosis and Bronchiectasis
Pleural Effusion/Pneumothorax/Empyema
PIPDCG 11 Gastrointestinal Obstruction/Perforation
Gastrointestinal Hemorrhage
Paroxysmal Ventricular Tachycardia
Bacterial Pneumonia
Cellulitis and Bullous Skin Disorders
See footnotes at end of table.
ficiaries with no prior-year hospitalizations
or excluded low-future-cost admissions
only—is based solely on demographic fac-
tors.  A beneficiary’s relative risk factor
increases from its demographic baseline if
and only if he or she is assigned to one of
the PIPDCGs numbered 5-29. 
Table 5 shows the number of admissions
used in different stages of the PIPDCG
modeling.  Final assignment to a PIPDCG
is based on diagnostic information relating
to only 40 percent of base-year admissions.
Diagnoses on 37 percent of admissions are
omitted because their principal diagnoses
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Table 4—Continued
Diagnoses Included in Each Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group (PIPDCG)
Group Diagnosis
PIPDCG 10 Colon Cancer2
Schizophrenic Disorders
Post-Myocardial Infarction
Unstable Angina
Thromboembolic Vascular Disease
Kidney Infection
Vertebral Fracture Without Spinal Cord Injury
PIPDCG 9 Other Cancers2
Pancreatitis/Other Pancreatic Disorders
Acute Myocardial Infarction
Transient Cerebral Ischemia
Fractures of Skull/Face
Pelvic Fracture
Hip Fracture
Internal Injuries/Traumatic Amputations/Third-Degree Burns
PIPDCG 8 Cancer of Uterus/Cervix/Female Genital Organs2
Peptic Ulcer
Valvular and Rheumatic Heart Disease
Hypertension, Complicated
Coronary Atherosclerosis
Angina Pectoris
Atrial Arrhythmia
Precerebral Arterial Occlusion
Aortic and Other Arterial Aneurysm
Asthma
Brain Injury
Artificial Opening of Gastrointestinal Tract Status
PIPDCG 7 Central Nervous System Infections
Abdominal Hernia, Complicated
Alcohol/Drug Dependence
PIPDCG 6 Cancer of Prostate/Testis/Male Genital Organs2
PIPDCG 5 Breast Cancer2
Ongoing Pregnancy with Complications
Ongoing Pregnancy with No or Minor Complications
PIPDCG 4 No or Excluded Inpatient Admissions
Ectopic Pregnancy
Miscarriage/Terminated Pregnancy
Completed Pregnancy with Major Complications
Completed Pregnancy with Complications
Completed Pregnancy Without Complications (Normal Delivery)
1 Includes principal and secondary inpatient diagnoses of HIV/AIDS.
2 Includes principal diagnoses and secondary diagnoses when the principal diagnosis is chemotherapy.
NOTES: HIV is human immunodeficiency virus. AIDS is acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
SOURCE: Health Economics Research, Inc., Waltham, MA, 1999.
put them in PIPDxGs that are excluded
(although one-third of these are associated
with people who have other hospitaliza-
tions that do increase their expected
costs).  Another 21 percent of hospitaliza-
tions do not affect payment because their
PIPDCG assignment was no higher than a
PIPDCG associated with another admis-
sion for the same person.  Finally, another
2 percent of admissions are ignored
because they are associated with stays of
less than 2 days (discussed later).
Table 6 shows frequencies and mean
expenditures of the PIPDCGs in our 1995-
1996 FFS data.  In the end, 12 percent of
beneficiaries—and 70 percent of beneficia-
ries hospitalized (with length of stay
greater than 1 day) in year 1—were
assigned to PIPDCGs that raise payments.
Because the PIPDCG model is fully hierar-
chical and assigns beneficiaries to a single
diagnostic category, readmission for the
same diagnosis, or rehospitalization for the
same or lower-future-cost diagnoses, does
not affect PIPDCG assignment.  Although
incentives for hospitalization are inherent
in any inpatient-based risk-adjustment
model, the PIPDCG model does not
reward multiple hospitalizations.
Demographic Factors
Although the main focus of the PIPDCG
model is on using diagnostic information,
demographic variables remain important
predictors of subsequent-year spending.
Demographic information explains a signif-
icant amount of variation of spending that
is unrelated to observed hospital diag-
noses, and hence was included in the
model.  As explained previously, a benefi-
ciary’s relative risk score is determined by
adding a demographic factor and a hospital
diagnosis factor.  The incremental effect of
diagnostic category and demographic fac-
tors on future expenditures was estimated
using linear regression.
Medicare’s original capitation payment
methodology, the AAPCC, employed the
following demographic factors:  age, sex,
Medicaid enrollment, residence in an insti-
tution, and working-aged status (where
Medicare is the secondary payer to a pri-
vate group health insurance plan).  We
examined all these factors, plus one addi-
tional factor, “originally disabled” status.  
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Table 5
Statistics for Admissions Used in Different Stages of PIPDCG Modeling
Percentage of
Admissions in
Number of PIPDCG Sorting
Admissions in 1995 Admissions Percentage Algorithm
Total Admissions1 415,231    100.0 —
Excluded Admissions Due to Exclusions of PIPDxG 153,276    36.9 —
Admissions of People with an Included Admission 55,210    13.3 —
Admissions of People Without an Included Admission 98,066    23.6 —
Remaining Admissions Participate in the PIPDCG Sorting Algorithm 261,955    63.1 100.0
Exclusions Due to Multiple Admissions per Person2 85,389    20.6 32.6
Excluded Short-Stay Admissions3 8,889    2.1 3.4
Admissions Used to Define PIPDCG 167,677    40.4 64.0
1 There were 258,363 persons with at least one admission in 1995.
2 For a person with multiple admissions in 1995, only the admission with the highest future cost was used to determine the PIPDCG. However, one
person may have multiple admissions for the same principal inpatient diagnosis.
3 Zero- or 1-day stays.
NOTES: PIPDCG is Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group. PIPDxG is Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Group.
SOURCE: Health Economics Research, Inc., analysis of 1995 and 1996 Medicare claims data, Waltham, MA, 1999.
Age and Sex
The AAPCC used 10 age categories,
each split into male and female, for exam-
ple, female, age 65-69, male, age 35-44.  We
adopted these cells, with one exception.
To reflect the rapidly growing numbers of
very old Medicare beneficiaries, we split
the AAPCC’s single “age 85 or over” cate-
gory into three:  age 85-89, age 90-94, and
age 95 or over.  Each age category is again
stratified by sex (male/female) to produce
a total of 24 age/sex categories, as shown
in Table 1.
Medicaid Status
Medicaid status is a factor in the AAPCC
methodology.  Mean Medicare expendi-
tures for Medicare-Medicaid dually eligi-
ble beneficiaries are 29 percent higher
than predicted by age, sex, and principal
hospital diagnosis.  Setting accurate rela-
tive Medicare risk scores for Medicare-
Medicaid enrollees requires an explicit
adjustment for the higher expenditures of
dually eligible persons.  Such an adjust-
ment prices this vulnerable subgroup of
Medicare beneficiaries accurately, encour-
aging health plans to enroll persons who
are also eligible for Medicaid in Medicare.
Medicaid status is routinely available in
HCFA administrative files, and it is rela-
tively immune to manipulation by health
plans. (Plans could attempt to enroll in
Medicaid as many of their Medicare
enrollees as possible to obtain higher
Medicare capitation payments.  This is not
necessarily undesirable.)
Medicaid status does have disadvan-
tages as a risk adjuster.  Medicaid eligibili-
ty rules vary widely across States, result-
ing in divergent proportions of the poor
enrolled in Medicaid programs.  Thus,
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics on PIPDCGs, by Group
Percentage
of Those
Percentage Hospitalized1 Mean 1996 Standard Error
Group Frequency of Sample in 1995 Expenditures of the Mean
Entire Sample 1,387,105  100.00    — 5,186      12           
Those with at Least One Admission1 241,495  17.41    100.00   11,472      47           
PIPDCG 42 1,217,773  87.79    — 4,162      11           
PIPDCG 5 1,677  0.12    0.69   5,897      292           
PIPDCG 6 1,640  0.12    0.68   6,489      338           
PIPDCG 7 1,771  0.13    0.73   7,406      315           
PIPDCG 8 25,977  1.87    10.76   8,628      116           
PIPDCG 9 21,077  1.52    8.73   9,540      139           
PIPDCG 10 14,226  1.03    5.89   10,366      158           
PIPDCG 11 21,012  1.51    8.70   11,427      161           
PIPDCG 12 26,592  1.92    11.01   13,124      142           
PIPDCG 14 7,016  0.51    2.91   15,102      317           
PIPDCG 16 29,378  2.12    12.17   17,348      178           
PIPDCG 18 5,611  0.40    2.32   18,381      415           
PIPDCG 20 5,731  0.41    2.37   22,385      473           
PIPDCG 23 4,339  0.31    1.80   24,294      641           
PIPDCG 26 1,869  0.13    0.77   26,461      975           
PIPDCG 29 1,416  0.10    0.59   30,456      1,597           
Sum3 of PIPDCGs 5-29 169,332  12.21    70.12   — —
1 With length of stay greater than 1 day.
2 Contains beneficiaries with no 1995 hospital admissions, excluded admissions only, short-stay admissions only, and certain other low-cost 
admissions only.
3 Contains all beneficiaries whose hospital admission (diagnosis) results in a higher capitation payment the following year.
NOTE: PIPDCG is Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group.
SOURCE: Health Economics Research, Inc., analysis of 1995 and 1996 Medicare claims data, Waltham, MA, 1999.
Medicaid status is an imperfect indicator of
poverty status, which has historically been
linked to higher health care costs.  The
non-Medicaid poor may also incur higher
Medicare expenditures, but this group can-
not be identified using HCFA’s administra-
tive files.  Also, it is not entirely clear why
Medicaid status predicts higher future
health care expenditures.  It could be a
proxy for aspects of health or functional
status that are not captured by other avail-
able measures.  (One subgroup of
Medicaid enrollees, the medically needy,
are eligible for Medicaid by virtue of high
health care expenses.  For this subgroup,
Medicaid enrollment is clearly a proxy for
poor health.)  Or it could be related to
socioeconomic characteristics, such as
reduced literacy or inadequate social sup-
port, of poorer beneficiaries that result in
higher health care expenses.
We believe the advantages of including
Medicaid status outweigh the disadvan-
tages, so we included it in the PIPDCG
model.  We conducted several analyses to
determine the form of the Medicaid adjust-
ment in the PIPDCG model.  The primary
issues were:
• Should the adjustment be prospective or
concurrent?
• Should the proportion of the year in
Medicaid status be taken into account?
• Should the adjustment differ for sub-
groups of Medicaid beneficiaries?
• Should the adjustment differ by age and
sex?
In the old AAPCC, the Medicaid adjust-
ment was based on Medicaid enrollment in
the month of Medicare payment.  That is,
the Medicaid adjustment was concurrent
with payment.  We adopted an alternative
approach:  making the Medicaid adjust-
ment prospective.  A prospective adjust-
ment is more consistent with the prospec-
tive risk-adjustment framework of the
PIPDCG model, where adjustment is made
for factors observable to health plans in
year 1 when they enroll beneficiaries.  A
prospective approach also has administra-
tive advantages, allowing Medicaid status
to be observed and payment rates deter-
mined in advance of payment.  A prospec-
tive approach is consistent with the per-
spective that Medicaid status is a socioeco-
nomic indicator.  (In fact, because
Medicaid status adds to costs even in the
payment year, Medicaid status does not
appear to be measuring substitutions of
Medicaid care for Medicare care.)  We
found empirically that accounting for the
number of Medicaid-eligible months in
year 1 had little effect on the magnitude of
the Medicaid adjustment.  Hence, we
adopted the simple approach of assigning
Medicaid status to any beneficiary with at
least 1 month of Medicaid enrollment in
the base year.  
We investigated whether to differentiate
the Medicaid adjustment by four broad cat-
egories of reason for Medicaid eligibility.
Unfortunately, however, State reporting of
such reasons to HCFA is problematic.
Inaccurate assignment of dually eligible
beneficiaries to eligibility categories is one
reason we do not favor differentiating the
Medicaid adjustment by eligibility status.
In addition, when we estimated separate
adjustments using available data, their
magnitudes did not vary substantially.2
This small gain in payment accuracy from
making eligibility distinctions is a second
reason for adopting a single adjustment for
Medicaid status.  Should the reporting of
eligibility categories improve, a more
refined adjustment for Medicaid status
could be reconsidered.
With regard to the issue of differentia-
tion by age and sex, we found reasonably
large differences in the Medicaid factor by
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2 The lack of larger differences in predicted expenditures by
Medicaid eligibility category may be attributable to the inaccu-
rate assignment of beneficiaries to these categories.  Random
error in assignment can obscure real differences.
age and sex even after addressing differ-
ences in illness burden with the PIPDCG
factor.  To calibrate the Medicaid adjust-
ment, we interacted Medicaid with each of
the 24 age and sex cells.  Actuarial smooth-
ing was used to specify the Medicaid
adjustment for some extreme-age cells
with few beneficiaries.
Originally Disabled Status
“Originally disabled” refers to beneficia-
ries currently entitled to Medicare by age
(i.e., 65 years of age or over) but originally
entitled to Medicare when under age 65 by
disability.  This demographic factor was not
used in Medicare’s AAPCC payment
methodology.  However, originally disabled
beneficiaries are 43 percent more expen-
sive than predicted by age, sex, and princi-
pal hospital diagnoses.  The advantages of
making an explicit adjustment for original-
ly disabled status are similar to the advan-
tages of adjusting for Medicaid.  Medicare
managed care should be paid a fair price so
that members of this vulnerable group will
be as attractive to health plans as other
Medicare enrollees.  Originally disabled
status is routinely available from HCFA
administrative files and relatively immune
to manipulation by health plans.  
An additional advantage of an adjust-
ment for originally disabled status is that it
establishes an appropriate age profile of
relative risk factors for the Medicare dis-
abled population.  If an adjustment is not
made, the relative risk factor for a disabled
Medicare beneficiary falls when that bene-
ficiary turns 65 (because the average dis-
abled beneficiary of age 64 has higher
health care needs than the average new
enrollee of age 65 to Medicare).  With
adjustment, relative risk factors rise appro-
priately as disabled beneficiaries age.  This
effect can be seen in Table 1, where, for
example, the demographic factor for a dis-
abled male age 64 is 0.760, while for an
originally disabled male age 65 it is 0.956 =
0.541 + 0.415.
Just as Medicaid status is an imperfect
proxy for poverty, originally disabled is an
imperfect proxy for disability in the elderly
Medicare population.  It does not capture
beneficiaries who become disabled after
age 64.  Also, qualifying for Medicare dis-
ability benefits requires a total inability to
work for at least 2 years, and eligibility
rules for disability benefits and their inter-
pretation vary over time.  Finally, not all
individuals who qualify for benefits actual-
ly apply for them.  In short, although origi-
nally disabled status identifies an impor-
tant group of higher cost Medicare 
beneficiaries, it is not a comprehensive 
population-based measure of disability.
We included originally disabled status in
the PIPDCG model.  Its effects are differ-
entiated by age/sex cell through interac-
tion terms in a regression model and sub-
sequent actuarial smoothing of cells with
small sample sizes.  We investigated inter-
action effects between originally disabled
and Medicaid but found that they were not
significant.  Hence, the originally disabled
and Medicaid adjustments are additive.
The incremental payments associated with
being originally disabled decrease with
increasing age.
Working-Aged Status
Though historically termed “working-
aged,” this factor is more accurately a mea-
sure of Medicare’s financial liability rather
than the employment status of the benefi-
ciary.  When a Medicare beneficiary is
enrolled in a private group health insur-
ance plan, by law the private plan is the pri-
mary payer for the beneficiary’s health
care.  Medicare will only pay for Medicare-
covered services that are not covered by
the private plan or for cost-sharing
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imposed by the private plan that exceeds
Medicare cost-sharing.  Beneficiaries with
private group health insurance are said to
be in working-aged status, because typical-
ly they obtain private insurance through
employment or the employment of a
spouse.  (Working-aged status refers only
to beneficiaries entitled to Medicare by age
[i.e., those who are 65 years of age or
over].  By definition, the Medicare dis-
abled population under age 65 is rarely
employed.)  Working-aged was an adjust-
ment factor under HCFA’s AAPCC capita-
tion methodology.  Unlike Medicaid status,
it is inherently a year 2 (payment year)
adjuster, because Medicare expenditures
are lower during the months when
Medicare is a secondary payer.  Medicare
expenditures for working-aged beneficia-
ries may also be lower because employ-
ment may be a marker for better health sta-
tus.  (As previously noted, not all working-
aged beneficiaries are employed, because
some beneficiaries may obtain private
insurance coverage through their spouses.) 
We developed a multiplicative adjust-
ment for working-aged status.  The multi-
plier is applied to the relative risk factor
derived for a beneficiary as if he or she
were not in working-aged status.  The mul-
tiplier scales the risk factor downward for
the lower expenditures of beneficiaries
with private insurance.  We used the data
to determine empirically a working-aged
factor of 0.21.  Our calculation creates
annual payments that are correct, on aver-
age, assuming that beneficiaries receive
the full amount suggested by their PIPDCG
factor in months that Medicare is the pri-
mary payer, and 21 percent of that amount
in months where they have working-aged
status.
The relative risk factor for a male benefi-
ciary age 68 who is not enrolled in
Medicaid, was not previously entitled by
disability, and was not hospitalized in the
base year is 0.541.  If this male is employed
with private group health insurance, his
relative risk factor is reduced to 21 percent
of 0.541, or 0.114. That is, this beneficiary
is expected to cost Medicare only 11 per-
cent as much as the average beneficiary.
Our estimate of a working-aged factor is
based on FFS experience in the traditional
Medicare program, the only nationally rep-
resentative data available. Describing the
costs of working-aged Medicare beneficia-
ries enrolled in Medicare managed care
plans is a subject for future research.  If
these beneficiaries are also enrolled
through their employer in private managed
care plans with comprehensive benefits,
their Medicare-covered costs may be even
lower than we have estimated.
Institutional Status
The final demographic factor we consid-
ered was institutional status, another factor
used in calculating Medicare’s AAPCC.  If
a beneficiary is a resident of a qualifying
institution on the last day of a month and
for the 29 prior consecutive days, the ben-
eficiary qualifies for the higher institution-
al payment rate in the following month.
Institutional status is thus primarily a con-
current (year 2), rather than prospective
(year 1) adjustment.  Institutional status is
not routinely available in Medicare admin-
istrative files, but is reported by health
plans for managed care enrollees to HCFA.
Because institutional status is not avail-
able in HCFA’s claims or enrollment files,
we used the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey (MCBS) to analyze expenditures of
institutionalized beneficiaries.  The MCBS
is a population-based in-person panel sur-
vey of about 12,000 Medicare beneficiaries
per year.  Medicare claims data for MCBS
respondents are merged to the survey
files.  Detailed information on institutional
status is collected by the survey.  We ana-
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lyzed expenditures in 3 years: 1992, 1993,
and 1994.  Expenditures in each year were
normalized to the same mean, $5,186, as in
our 5-percent sample.  There were 32,228
observations in our MCBS sample.
Observations are person-years, many of
which represent the same person in multi-
ple years.  Expenditure data for beneficia-
ries who exited from the survey were
obtained from Medicare claims files.
Sample selection criteria and variable defi-
nitions for our MCBS analysis were essen-
tially equivalent to those for our analysis of
the Medicare 5-percent sample.  Results
are weighted using the product of the sur-
vey sampling weight and (for persons who
died) the fraction of the year eligible for
Medicare.  For the institutionalized, expen-
ditures are also weighted by the fraction of
the year institutionalized.
Table 7 compares mean actual and pre-
dicted expenditures in the MCBS sample
by institutional and Medicaid status.
Expenditures are predicted using the
PIPDCG model, including age, sex, princi-
pal inpatient diagnoses, and Medicaid and
originally disabled statuses.  For the insti-
tutionalized population as a whole, the
PIPDCG model (excluding institutional sta-
tus) predicts mean Medicare expenditures
accurately.  It is not necessary to include an
explicit, separate adjustment for institution-
al status to ensure that the PIPDCG model
reflects the average expenditures of this
vulnerable group accurately.
Expenditures are not predicted accurate-
ly for important subgroups of the institu-
tionalized, however.  Expenditures are
overpredicted by 38 percent for residents
of nursing homes, most of whom are long-
term residents (average months institu-
tionalized per nursing home resident per
year is 10.3).  These long-term residents
may have significant health care costs, but
many of these costs are the responsibility
of Medicaid or private insurance rather
than Medicare, or are paid out of pocket.
Conversely, expenditures are substantially
underpredicted for beneficiaries who
reside in a SNF.  Beneficiaries with a SNF
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Table 7
Actual Compared with Predicted Expenditures, by Institutional Status
Average Annual Mean
Months Annualized Expenditures Predictive
Group Status Observations Institutionalized Actual Predicted1 Ratio2
Entire Sample 32,228   — 5,186   5,186   1.00
Neither Medicaid nor Institutionalized 25,369   — 4,547   4,723   1.04
All Institutionalized 2,715   — 8,570   8,534   1.00
Nursing Home Only 2,044   10.28        6,371   8,766   1.38
All Other Situations 671   7.52        18,412   7,496   0.41
SNF Only 77   1.32        46,159   7,209   0.16
SNF/Nursing Home 261   6.60        33,364   10,278   0.31
Mixed 27   8.60        34,315   8,833   0.26
ICF/MR 195   11.45        3,040   4,407   1.45
Mental Health 82   10.85        6,312   6,268   0.99
Hospital 21   9.88        3,463   7,356   2.12
Rehabilitation 8   10.83        8,313   8,613   1.04
Medicaid 5,471   — 7,131   7,612   1.07
Medicaid and Institutionalized 1,327   — 7,617   9,164   1.20
Not Medicaid and Institutionalized 1,388   — 9,605   7,849   0.82
1 By PIPDCG model.
2 Predicted divided by actual expenditures.
NOTES: PIPDCG is Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group model. SNF is skilled nursing facility. ICF/MR is intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded.
SOURCE: Health Economics Research, Inc., analysis of 1991-1994 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey data, Waltham, MA, 1999.
stay are presumably post-acute care
patients, because Medicare requires a hos-
pitalization prior to a covered SNF stay.
(Average months institutionalized per year
for SNF only is 1.3, and for SNF/nursing
home is 6.6.)  The long-term versus post-
acute dichotomy is also reflected in the
overprediction of expenditures for institu-
tionalized Medicaid beneficiaries versus
the underprediction of expenditures for
beneficiaries not enrolled in Medicaid.  As
beneficiaries reside longer in nursing
homes, they are more likely to become
impoverished and qualify for Medicaid. 
It is clear that the Medicare institutionalized
population contains two distinct subpopula-
tions, a very expensive post-acute care popu-
lation receiving SNF care and a much-less-
expensive long-term care population in nurs-
ing homes.  An adjustment for the long-term
nursing home population would be negative
because Medicare expenditures are overpre-
dicted for this group.  It seems undesirable to
discourage health plans from enrolling this
vulnerable group through a negative adjust-
ment.  Also, as a practical matter, HCFA would
rely on plans to self-report the data used to
reduce payments—a problematic scenario.
Although use of post-acute care SNF services
in the payment year is an indicator of illness
severity, it is inconsistent with a prospective,
diagnosis-based capitation model to increase
payments for current-year service use.
Because the SNF stay is precipitated by a hos-
pitalization, the prospective PIPDCG will iden-
tify some of these high-cost beneficiaries.  For
these reasons, we do not favor adjustments for
institutionalized subpopulations.  No adjust-
ment for institutional status is included in the
PIPDCG risk-adjustment model.
Excluding Short Hospital Stays
Because of concerns that health plans
may overadmit patients in order to
increase payments, we explored the sensi-
tivity of the model to including and exclud-
ing diagnoses from short hospital stays.
The concern is that payments based only
on hospitalizations may give health plans
an incentive to hospitalize enrollees to
increase future payments.  In its utilization
review of hospital admissions, the health
plan weighs the expected marginal rev-
enue and marginal costs of the hospitaliza-
tion along with the benefits of treatment to
the patient.  Even if plans are largely deliv-
ering appropriate care, raising the margin-
al cost of getting a hospital diagnosis that
“counts” for risk adjustment reduces the
incentive to hospitalize. Requiring hospital-
izations of at least 2 days raises the mar-
ginal cost of getting a hospital diagnosis
counted and discourages this undesirable
strategy.
Excluding short-stay diagnoses has
advantages and disadvantages.  To the
extent that length of stay is a proxy for
severity of illness, short-stay patients are
less severely ill and less expensive in the
future than longer stay patients.  Excluding
short-stay diagnoses does not degrade
very much the accuracy of the risk-
adjustment model in predicting future
expenses.  Short-stay hospitalizations may
be highly substitutable for certain diagnos-
tic and therapeutic procedures, drug
administration, observation, screening,
and rule-out diagnoses that are often
appropriately performed in the outpatient
setting.  Attaching a substantially greater
future payment to inpatient, as opposed to
outpatient, testing and procedures gives
health plans a strong incentive to perform
these activities in the hospital.  Excluding
short-stay diagnoses limits this incentive.
Finally, excluding diagnoses arising from
short stays eliminates penalties to health
plans that avoid unnecessary short-stay
admissions; models with such exclusions
may thus provide a more level playing field
among plans.
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Excluding short-stay diagnoses also has
disadvantages.  Although less expensive in
the future than longer stay patients, short-
stay patients are more expensive than the
non-hospitalized patients.  Excluding short
stays reduces the risk-adjustment model’s
predictive accuracy.  Although excluding
short-stay diagnoses lessens incentives to
admit, paying more only when diagnoses
come from longer stays gives health plans
an incentive to increase length of stay.
Manipulating length of stay is probably
easier than increasing the admission rate.
Excluding short-stay diagnoses penalizes
plans that are effective in reducing inap-
propriately long hospital stays. Short stays
are often clinically appropriate and indicat-
ed.  Clinical review of the appropriateness
of hospital admissions—such as by 
the peer review organizations under
Medicare’s PPS for hospitals—is a more
refined approach to excluding inappropri-
ate admissions than a blanket exclusion of
diagnoses from short stays.
We developed empirical evidence on the
frequency and future costs associated with
short-stay admissions in our 1995-1996 FFS
5-percent sample Medicare data.  We
defined short-stay admissions as zero-day
stays (i.e., the same admission and dis-
charge dates), or 1-day overnight stays
(i.e., discharge date 1 day later than admis-
sion date).3 In assigning beneficiaries to
PIPDCG 5 or above (thus raising a benefi-
ciary’s relative risk factor), after removing
stays with excluded diagnoses and multiple
admissions per beneficiary, only 2.1 per-
cent of total 1995 admissions were exclud-
ed because they were short stays (Table 5).
As for costliness, we found that the future
expenses of beneficiaries whose PIPDCG is
assigned by a 1-day stay is 17 percent lower
than predicted by the PIPDCG model.  So
the future expenditures associated with
short stays are significantly lower than
future expenditures associated with longer
stays.  However, the future expenditures of
beneficiaries with short-stay hospitaliza-
tions are greater than future expenditures
of the never-hospitalized.  Excluding diag-
noses from short stays reduced the predic-
tive power (R2) of the PIPDCG model from
5.72 to 5.69 percent.
HCFA made a policy decision to exclude
diagnoses from short stays in the PIPDCG
payment model.  For the initial implemen-
tation of risk adjustment, this approach
focuses on the more severely ill longer stay
patients, while eliminating the sensitivity of
payments to increased short-stay admis-
sions of less ill patients.  The short-stay
patients are included in the lowest paying
DCG, along with those who are not hospi-
talized and those with excluded diagnoses.
Ignoring short stays raises the coefficients
on the demographic variables slightly.
REGRESSION MODEL
The final PIPDCG model includes the
following risk factors to explain future
Medicare expenditures: 24 age/sex cells,
Medicaid status interacted with age/sex
cells, originally disabled status interacted
with age/sex cells, working-aged status,
and the 16 PIPDCG diagnostic categories
assigned from prior-year principal hospital
diagnoses.  The incremental effects of
these beneficiary characteristics on
Medicare expenditures were estimated in
a linear multiple regression model, with
annualized 1996 Medicare expenditures as
the dependent variable.  All risk factors
except for working-aged were used as pre-
dictors.  Beneficiaries with working-aged
months in 1995 or 1996 were excluded
from the regression sample, and a multi-
plicative adjustment for working-aged sta-
tus was determined as already described.
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3 In Medicare’s PPS for hospitals, length of stay is determined by
adding 1 to discharge date minus admission date.  Thus, what
we call “zero-day stays” would be referred to as “1-day stays” in
PPS terminology, and our “1-day stays” in PPS are “2-day stays.”
The regression was estimated on the
1995-1996 5-percent random sample of
Medicare beneficiaries, representing
1,387,105 individuals, and was weighted for
months of beneficiary Medicare eligibility
in 1996.  After actuarial smoothing of a few
demographic coefficients estimated from
small sample sizes in the extreme age
ranges, the relative risk factors shown in
Table 1 were derived by dividing the
regression coefficients by mean expendi-
tures.  The population mean of $5,100 was
used rather than the sample mean of
$5,186 for this calculation.  (HCFA provid-
ed the mean expenditures for the full FFS
Medicare population.  The sample used for
model development did not include new
enrollees because a full year of data was
not available for them.)  For example, the
estimated coefficient of PIPDCG 6, which
contains the diagnosis prostate cancer, was
$2,333.  This coefficient means that, hold-
ing constant a beneficiary’s age, sex,
Medicaid status, and originally disabled
status, a 1995 hospitalization for prostate
cancer was associated with an average
$2,333 higher Medicare expenditures in
1996 (assuming the hospitalization for
prostate cancer was the beneficiary’s only
1995 hospitalization or that any other hos-
pitalizations were assigned to lower ranked
PIPDCGs).  Dividing this coefficient by the
mean (2,333/5,100) yields the relative risk
factor of 0.458 (or about 46 percent of the
average expenditure) for PIPDCG 6 shown
in Table 1.  This hospitalization risk factor
is added to the beneficiary’s demographic
risk factor to determine his or her total rel-
ative risk factor.
EVALUATION OF MODEL
After developing the PIPDCG payment
model, we evaluated its predictive accuracy
and stability.  We used two samples to
judge predictive accuracy and stability:
our 5-percent 1995-1996 random sample of
Medicare beneficiaries (n = 1,387,105), and
our 1991-1994 sample of  beneficiaries from
the MCBS (n = 32,021 person years).  The
5-percent sample used to judge predictive
accuracy is the same as our model devel-
opment sample.  We did not reserve a por-
tion of our sample for validation because
similar PIPDCG models have been exten-
sively validated in previous work (Ellis et
al., 1996).  Because hospitalizations for
many diagnoses, even in the Medicare pop-
ulation, are relatively rare events, we felt
that it was more important to maximize the
sample available for model development.
In addition, our previous work has shown
that with the large sample sizes we use,
predictive accuracy calculated for model
development and validation samples is sim-
ilar, although estimation sample statistics
may slightly overstate the performance of
the model in new data (Ellis et al., 1996).  
The MCBS sample, on the other hand, is
an independent validation sample.  But sta-
tistics computed from it are subject to much
greater random variation because its sample
size is so much smaller.  We prefer predic-
tive ratios from the much larger 5-percent
sample and present them where possible.
We focus on predictive accuracy for groups
not defined as risk factors in the PIPDCG
model.  It is not surprising, especially for the
5-percent estimation sample, that the model
performs well for groups defined by risk fac-
tors included in the model, and we do not
present such results here (refer to Pope et
al., 1999, for these statistics).
Predictive Accuracy
We present two statistics to judge model
predictive accuracy:  the R2 statistic and
predictive ratios.  R2 is the percentage of
total variance in Medicare expenditures
that is predicted by the risk-adjustment
model.  It measures the predictive accura-
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cy of the model for individual beneficiaries.
A predictive ratio is the ratio of mean pre-
dicted expenditures to mean actual expen-
ditures for a subgroup of beneficiaries.
The predictive ratio measures the accuracy
of model prediction for groups of benefi-
ciaries, with a ratio closer to 1.00 indicating
better prediction.
R2 Statistic
The estimation R2 of the PIPDCG model
was 6.2 percent.  The R2 of a demographic
model including age, sex, Medicaid status,
and originally disabled status was 1.5 per-
cent.  Thus, the PIPDCG model represents
a fourfold improvement in predictive accu-
racy over a demographic model in our
data.  Models including diagnoses from all
care settings and accounting for the pres-
ence of multiple clinical conditions per per-
son have achieved R2 values as high as
approximately 9 percent (Ellis et al., 1996).
The PIPDCG model, relying only on the
single most predictive principal inpatient
diagnosis, achieves about two-thirds of the
performance of models using data from all
settings and multiple conditions.  
The theoretical maximum R2 for a
prospective risk-adjustment model (i.e., a
model predicting expenditures based on
prior-year individual characteristics) has
been estimated to be 20-25 percent
(Newhouse et al., 1989).  Hence, the PIPD-
CG model appears to predict about one-
quarter to one-third of the potentially
explainable variance in expenditures.
Although this may seem low, no prospec-
tive risk-adjustment model that predicts
anywhere close to the theoretical maxi-
mum has been devised without using vari-
ables that directly measure prior utiliza-
tion.  Also, increasing next year’s payments
because more services were used this year
rewards plans because they spend more
money—a feature that is inconsistent with
health-risk-based payments.  A Medicare
risk-adjustment model only needs to pre-
dict expenditures approximately as well as
health plans can, so that plans find that
they receive payments that equal their
expected costs for enrollees.
Still, the R2 values of prospective risk-
adjustment models are quite low in absolute
terms (i.e., relative to 100 percent, or perfect
prediction) and modest relative to the sup-
posed theoretically attainable maximums.
The low R2 values remind us that there is
considerable variability in medical expenses
due to the random onset of acute illness that
must remain the province of insurance risk-
pooling.  The PIPDCG and other prospective
risk-adjustment models cannot be expected
to, and do not, predict expenditures accu-
rately for individual beneficiaries.  There is
also substantial room for improvement in
risk-adjustment models, much of which
probably will have to await the availability of
more clinically detailed and precise data on
beneficiaries, such as their functional status
or severity of illness within specific diagnos-
tic groups.  In the meantime, health plans
(or beneficiaries) possessing more accurate
information can engage in profitable biased
selection against capitation payments incor-
porating even health-based risk adjustment.
Imperfect clinical risk adjustment, never-
theless, is better than no clinical risk adjust-
ment, as even imperfect risk adjustment will
limit selection opportunities and may be
“good enough” to deter the most flagrant
and injurious forms of risk selection.
The R2 is a measure of the proportion of
individual variability that is explained by a
risk-adjustment model.  It can be an overly
pessimistic measure, however, because
health plans are generally only able to
increase their enrollment within categories
of similar individuals (for example, by
advertising the excellence of their care to
cardiac patients) and cannot easily specifi-
cally recruit, say, only the healthier cardiac
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cases.  To better understand the ability of
the PIPDCG model to correctly predict
payments for groups of enrollees rather
than each individual, we examined its pre-
dictive ratios for selected groups of
enrollees.  As in Ash et al. (1989), the pre-
dictive ratios are defined as the ratio of pre-
dicted to actual spending for patients in
specific clinical groups.    
Predictive Ratios
Table 8 shows predictive ratios from two
models:  (1) a demographic model that uses
age, sex, Medicaid status, and originally dis-
abled status to predict expenditures; and (2)
the PIPDCG model, which includes, in addi-
tion to these demographic factors, prior-year
principal inpatient diagnoses grouped into
the 16 PIPDCG categories.  We compare the
PIPDCG model with a demographic model
to show the effect of adding a health-status
measure (prior-year hospital diagnoses) to
demographic risk adjusters.  Ratios are
shown for groups defined by prior-year
Medicare expenditure percentiles, number
of prior-year hospital admissions, chronic
conditions diagnosed during inpatient or
ambulatory encounters, beneficiary self-
rated general health status, and beneficiary
self-reported difficulty in activities of daily
living (ADLs), a measure of functional sta-
tus.  (ADLs include eating, bathing, dress-
ing, using the toilet, walking, and getting in
and out of chairs.)  The latter two groups can
be defined only for the smaller MCBS sur-
vey sample.  The other predictive ratios
were calculated for the much larger 
5-percent 1995-1996 sample.  The chronic
condition groups were defined by a prior-
year diagnosis in any care setting, ambulato-
ry (physician office, hospital outpatient) as
well as inpatient.
The PIPDCG model predicts expenditures
more accurately than the demographic
model for all groups defined by prior-year
expenditure percentiles, except for the
fourth quintile of prior-year expenditures.4
The effect of adding hospital diagnoses is
most dramatic for the most expensive, and
presumably sickest, beneficiaries.  For the
beneficiaries with the top 1 percent of prior-
year expenditures, the demographic model
projects expenditures that, on average, are
only 19 percent of actual average expendi-
tures.  The PIPDCG model improves the
average prediction for the most expensive
beneficiaries to 47 percent.  The improved
predictive accuracy of the PIPDCG model is
significant, yet it still overpredicts average
expenditures by a factor of 2 for beneficiaries
in the lowest quintile of prior-year expendi-
tures and underpredicts expenditures for
beneficiaries with the top 1 percent of prior-
year expenditures by approximately one-half.
The PIPDCG model predicts average
expenditures fairly accurately for beneficia-
ries with no, one, and two prior-year hospital-
izations, only underpredicting by a substan-
tial amount for beneficiaries with three or
more hospitalizations in the prior year.
(Recall that the model uses the principal diag-
nosis from the single hospitalization most
predictive of future expenses.)  The PIPDCG
model improves substantially upon the demo-
graphic model for all prior-year hospitaliza-
tion categories.  Although underpredicting
for all chronic disease groups, the PIPDCG
model does better for each diagnosis than the
demographic model.  The PIPDCG model
does best relative to demographics when the
diagnosis is most likely to be the reason for a
hospital admission, such as lung or pancreat-
ic cancer and intracerebral hemorrhage.  Its
predictive accuracy exceeds that of the
demographic model the least for diagnoses
with more outpatient-oriented treatment,
such as arthritis and hypertension.
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4 Because less than 20 percent of Medicare beneficiaries are hos-
pitalized in a year, the fourth expenditure quintile presumably
includes mostly beneficiaries with large outpatient expendi-
tures.  These beneficiaries are not distinguished by the PIPDCG
model, which includes only hospital inpatient diagnoses.
The PIPDCG model improves demo-
graphic predictions for all self-rated gener-
al health-status and functional-status
groups.  The proportional improvement is
the greatest for beneficiaries reporting the
worst (poor) health or the most functional
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Table 8
Predictive Ratios1 for Demographic and PIPDCG Risk-Adjustment Models, by Model and
Beneficiary Group
Beneficiary Group Demographic Model2 PIPDCG Model
Prior-Year Expenditures3
First Quintile (Lowest) 2.57 2.09
Second Quintile 1.88 1.54
Middle Quintile 1.35 1.10
Fourth Quintile 0.96 0.84
Fifth Quintile (Highest) 0.47 0.75
Top 5 Percent 0.29 0.61
Top 1 Percent 0.19 0.47
Prior-Year Hospital Admissions3
No Admissions 1.31 1.07
One Admission 0.66 1.02
Two Admissions 0.50 0.91
Three or More Admissions 0.31 0.69
Chronic Conditions3,4
Any Chronic Condition Below 0.84 0.89
Depression 0.59 0.77
Alcohol/Drug Dependence 0.44 0.78
Hypertensive Heart/Renal Disease 0.65 0.81
Benign/Unspecified Hypertension 0.83 0.90
Diabetes with Complications 0.47 0.63
Diabetes Without Complications 0.63 0.73
Heart Failure/Cardiomyopathy 0.51 0.74
Acute Myocardial Infarction 0.47 0.78
Other Heart Disease 0.66 0.80
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 0.63 0.79
Colorectal Cancer 0.59 0.78
Breast Cancer 0.75 0.81
Lung/Pancreatic Cancer 0.35 0.61
Other Stroke 0.53 0.74
Intracerebral Hemorrhage 0.42 0.73
Hip Fracture 0.59 0.83
Arthritis 0.79 0.84
Self-Rated General Health Status5
Poor 0.54 0.67
Fair 0.81 0.86
Good 1.03 1.01
Very Good 1.36 1.27
Excellent 1.74 1.57
Functional-Status5,6 Difficulty in:
5-6 ADLs7 0.61 0.74
3-4 ADLs7 0.69 0.76
1-2 ADLs7 0.83 0.85
None 1.33 1.26
1 Mean predicted expenditures for a group divided by mean actual expenditures.
2 Includes age/sex, Medicaid, originally disabled.
3 Calculated from 5-percent 1995-1996 Medicare sample.
4 Defined as beneficiaries with a 1995 diagnosis on a Medicare hospital inpatient, outpatient, physician, or other professional health claim.
5 Calculated from 1991-1994 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey sample.
6 Measured as difficulty with activities of daily living (ADLs).
7 Activities of daily living include eating, bathing, dressing, using the toilet, walking, and getting in and out of chairs.
NOTE: PIPDCG is Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group.
SOURCE: Health Economics Research, Inc., analysis of 1995-1996 Medicare data, and 1991-1994 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey,  Waltham, MA, 1999.
limitations (difficulty in performing five or
six ADLs).  Nevertheless, as with chronic
conditions, the model still underpredicts
for beneficiaries reporting the worst health
or the most functional limitations.
Overall, the impression from the predic-
tive ratios is that the PIPDCG model
improves predictive accuracy significantly
compared with a demographic model for
almost all groups but that it falls well short
of predicting future expenditures accurate-
ly in an absolute sense for many groups.  If
predictive accuracy were the only criterion
for a risk-adjustment model, we would
improve the predictions of the PIPDCG
model by incorporating additional informa-
tion into the model, such as that used to
define some of the evaluation groups.
However, in the design of the PIPDCG
model, predictive accuracy was sometimes
sacrificed to improve the behavioral incen-
tives of the model.  For example, account-
ing for multiple prior-year hospitalizations
or higher prior-year expenditures would
reward health plans that rehospitalized
enrollees or were inefficient in their expen-
ditures.  Moreover, some types of informa-
tion that can be used to improve predictive
accuracy, such as base-year expenditures,
ambulatory diagnoses, and survey health-
status measures, are not currently avail-
able for most Medicare managed care
enrollees.  (HCFA intends to collect
encounter data from all care settings,
which will provide ambulatory diagnoses
and imputed expenditures, as soon as prac-
tical.  And HCFA does collect survey
health-status measures for a sample of
enrollees in each Medicare managed care
plan through its Health Outcomes Survey.)
Stability
In addition to predictive accuracy, a
desirable property of a risk-adjustment
model is stability.  The model’s predictions
should be stable, replicable, and pre-
dictable from year to year for a population
that is not changing over time.  A county’s
Medicare enrollees or the enrollees of a
long-established health plan might consti-
tute a stable population.  The amount of
instability or random variation in a popula-
tion’s average relative risk score depends
upon the size of the population.  The inci-
dence of acute illness is largely random,
and in a small population, the number and
type of hospitalizations, and hence PIPDCG
assignments, will vary from year to year.
We analyzed the amount of random vari-
ation in mean risk scores as a function of
populations of different sizes, such as the
enrollees of small and large health plans.
Using the normal distribution approxima-
tion, the 95-percent confidence interval for
the mean relative risk score is given by 
RRS + 1.96*CV/«n,
where RRS = the calculated mean relative
risk score for a population, CV = the coeffi-
cient of variation of risk-adjustment model
predictions, and n = the number of benefi-
ciaries in the population.  Table 9 tabulates
95-percent confidence-interval factors for
demographic and PIPDCG models for pop-
ulations of different sizes.  For example, if
the mean demographic risk score for a
health plan with 1,000 enrollees is 1.05, the
95-percent confidence interval is 1.050 +
2.2 percent (that is, from 1.028 to 1.072).
The formula given in Table 9 shows that
the 95-percent confidence interval is pro-
portional to the coefficient of variation (CV)
of predictions.  Because its predicted values
have a wider range, the CV of 
PIPDCG model predictions is twice as large
as the CV of demographic model predic-
tions.  (Note that this increased CV is a
strength, not a weakness, of the PIPDCG
model; if diagnostic information were a per-
fect predictor of future resource use, then
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the CV would be the same as that of total
spending.)  For any population size, the 95-
percent confidence interval of the PIPDCG
prediction is approximately twice as large as
the confidence interval of the demographic
prediction.  That is, because it incorporates
an additional predictive factor, hospital diag-
noses, predictions from the PIPDCG model
are subject to more random variation than
demographic predictions.  Nevertheless, in
absolute terms, the degree of random varia-
tion is small for expected real-world health
plan sizes.  For a 5,000-person plan, the ran-
dom variation in PIPDCG predictions is +
1.9 percent, for a 10,000-person plan it is +
1.3 percent, and for a 50,000-person plan, it
is only + 0.6 percent.
Nevertheless, for very small popula-
tions, say of under 1,000, random variation
in mean PIPDCG risk scores is significant.
Might it be better for very small popula-
tions to use a demographic risk adjuster
than the PIPDCG adjuster?  A common
measure of predictive accuracy of models
is the mean square error, or MSE.  A well-
known relationship from statistics (e.g.,
Mood, Graybill, and Boes, 1974) is that 
MSE = variance + (bias)2
Inaccuracy in predictions due to random
small sample error is captured by the vari-
ance component of the MSE.  Inaccuracy
due to systematic misprediction by the
model is captured by the (bias)2 term.  In
our application, systematic misprediction
would occur because a demographic
model would not accurately capture the
health status of a population, no matter
how large the sample size.  In large popu-
lations, the variance of the mean risk
scores approaches zero, and the MSE
equals the square of the bias.  In large sam-
ples, clearly, an unbiased health-status-
based risk-adjustment model predicts
more accurately than a (biased) demo-
graphic model.  But in very small samples,
a demographic model, despite its bias,
might have an advantage in MSE predic-
tive accuracy because of the lower variance
of its predictions.  
We simulated the MSEs of the PIPDCG
model and an age/sex demographic model
for various sample sizes, degrees of bias,
and mean risk scores.  The simulations
showed that, unless the bias in the demo-
graphic (age/sex) model is very small
(e.g., 1 percent), the PIPDCG prediction is
expected to be more accurate for any real-
istic plan size.  For example, if the bias in
the age/sex model is 5 percent, the mean
PIPDCG risk scores have a smaller MSE
than the mean age/sex risk score for pop-
ulations (plans) with 250 or more members
(enrollees).
To confirm our stability results empiri-
cally, we used the MCBS to simulate and
compare national and regional mean risk
scores for each of the 3 years available in
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Table 9
95-Percent Confidence Intervals for Relative
Risk Scores, by Model and Population Size
Demographic PIPDCG
Item Model1 Model
Coefficient of 
Variation*100 34.717 68.295
Population Size2 Percent3
50 ±9.6 ±18.9
100 ±6.8 ±13.4
500 ±3.0 ±6.0
1,000 ±2.2 ±4.2
5,000 ±0.96 ±1.89
10,000 ±0.68 ±1.34
50,000 ±0.30 ±0.60
100,000 ±0.22 ±0.42
500,000 ±0.10 ±0.19
1,000,000 ±0.07 ±0.13
1 Includes age/sex, Medicaid, and originally disabled.
2 For example, number of health plan enrollees, or county residents.
3 Percentage points plus or minus for a population’s mean score.
NOTES: Calculated as 1.96*(CV/SQRT(Population Size)). For exam-
ple, if the mean demographic risk score for a health plan with 1,000
enrollees is 1.050, the 95-percent confidence interval is (1.028,
1.072). PIPDCG is Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Group.
SOURCE: Health Economics Research, Inc., analysis of 1995-1996
Medicare data, Waltham, MA, 1999.
our sample: 1992, 1993, and 1994.  The
MCBS provides a reasonable representa-
tion of a plan because it is a longitudinal
survey with substantial year-to-year overlap
but replenishment (turnover) for death and
attrition, with the goal of continuously rep-
resenting the national Medicare popula-
tion.  The national MCBS sample size is
about 12,000 per year, simulating enrollees
in a small-to-moderate size health plan,
while the regional sample sizes range from
about 1,500 to 4,000, simulating enrollees in
very small to small health plans.  The
results were consistent with predictions
from the simulations.  The PIPDCG model
was slightly more unstable than demo-
graphic models, especially in the very small
regional samples, but the degree of insta-
bility was well within acceptable bounds.
CONCLUSION
The PIPDCG model is a conservative
risk-adjustment model.  In simulations with
Medicare FFS data, it adjusts payments for
only 12 percent of enrollees based on their
health status.  To measure health status, it
utilizes only principal inpatient diagnoses,
which are the most widely available and
highest quality diagnoses.  The PIPDCG
model focuses on beneficiaries hospital-
ized for serious illnesses with longer hos-
pital stays.  For the initial implementation
of risk adjustment, the focus on the most
severely ill and expensive beneficiaries and
the most available and high-quality data
seems appropriate.  As more experience is
gained with risk adjustment and its data
and operational requirements, more
refined and comprehensive risk-adjustment
models can be implemented.
The PIPDCG model’s exclusive use of
inpatient diagnoses raises some issues
related to incentives and fairness.  Health
plans have an incentive to admit enrollees
to have diagnoses counted, and plans that
avoid unnecessary admissions may be
penalized.  More fully understanding these
issues will require analysis of managed
care encounter data and observing plans’
behavioral responses to implementation of
the PIPDCG model.  
Several factors mitigate concern over
the incentive to admit.  HCFA has
announced the PIPDCG model as transi-
tional to full-encounter risk adjustment,
which HCFA intends to implement as soon
as feasible.  Will plans significantly alter
their behavior in response to the incentives
of a transitional system that may be in
place for only a few years?  Moreover, in
the first year of implementation, 2000, clin-
ically risk-adjusted payments will be only
10 percent of total payments.  A plan is not
guaranteed a higher future payment if it
admits an enrollee.  The enrollee may die
or disenroll before the next payment peri-
od.  The uncertain higher future payment
coupled with the certain immediate cost of
hospitalization also limits the incentive to
unnecessarily hospitalize enrollees.  The
incentives of most non-Medicare insurers
continue to work against hospitalization,
perhaps too much so.  Will plans and
providers attempt to differentiate their
behavior for Medicare versus non-
Medicare enrollees?  Finally, we have
designed the PIPDCG model with con-
cerns about incentives in mind.
Specifically, none of the following lead to
increased PIPDCG-based payments: short-
stay hospitalizations; hospitalizations for
diagnoses that may be minor, transitory, or
non-specific; rehospitalizations; or multiple
hospitalizations.
When the DRG PPS for Medicare hospi-
talizations was implemented in the early
1980s, there was considerable concern
about inappropriate increases in admis-
sions.  Providers could benefit from the
lump sum per admission payment.  Yet the
expected increases in admission rates
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never materialized (Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission, 1998).  Health plan
admission behavior will need to be careful-
ly monitored by HCFA, just as hospital
admissions under the PPS were carefully
monitored by the HCFA-funded peer
review organizations.
Virtually all policy analysts agree that
health-based risk adjustment promotes the
successful long-term operation of competi-
tive capitated health insurance markets.
Health-based risk adjustment has been
long advocated and researched but is only
starting to be implemented.  Medicare’s
implementation of the PIPDCG model will
provide valuable experience with real-
world risk adjustment.
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